Hylla
Personnamn
Titel och upphov Group agency : the possibility, design, and status of corporate agents
Varianttitel Possibility, design, and status of corporate agents.
Utgivning, distribution etc. Oxford University Press, Oxford : 2013.
Utgivningsår
DDC klassifikationskod (Dewey Decimal Classification)
SAB klassifikationskod
Fysisk beskrivning ix, 238 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.
Anmärkning: Allmän Originally published: 2011.
Anmärkning: Bibliografi etc. Includes bibliographical references and index.
Anmärkning: Innehållsbeskrivning, sammanfattning Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should go about explaining the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable in the manner of individuals. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, in a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences.
Term
ISBN 978-0-19-967967-6 (pbk.) 0-19-967967-3 (pbk.)
Antal i kö:
*00001995nam a22004457a 4500
*00138996
*00520140620030911.9
*008121210r20132011xxka 001 0 eng d
*020 $a978-0-19-967967-6 (pbk.)
*020 $a0-19-967967-3 (pbk.)
*035 $a(SE-LIBR)16605889
*035 $a(Ko)43928
*040 $aUKMGB$beng$cUKMGB$dOCLCO$dYDXCP$dNJB
*08204$a128.4$223
*084 $aDh$2kssb/8
*084 $aOaa$2kssb/8
*1001 $aList, Christian
*24510$aGroup agency :$bthe possibility, design, and status of corporate agents /$cChristian List and Philip Pettit
*24630$aPossibility, design, and status of corporate agents.
*260 $aOxford :$bOxford University Press,$c2013.
*300 $aix, 238 p. :$bill. ;$c24 cm.
*500 $aOriginally published: 2011.
*504 $aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
*520 $aAre companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should go about explaining the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable in the manner of individuals. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, in a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences.
*599 $aImported from: libcat.qut.edu.au:210/INNOPAC (Do not remove)
*650 0$aAgent (Philosophy)
*650 0$aSocial choice.
*650 7$aHandlingsteori$2sao
*650 7$aGrupper$2sao
*650 0$aAction theory
*650 0$aSmall groups
*7001 $aPettit, Philip,$d1945-
*841 $5Ko$ax a$b1406194u 8 1001uu 0901128$e4
*852 $5Ko$bKo$hOa
*950 $aSamtalsgrupper$wh$uGrupper
*950 $aArbetsgrupper$wh$uGrupper
*950 $aEtniska grupper$wh$uGrupper
*950 $aIdrottslag$wh$uGrupper
*950 $aSocialt samspel$uGrupper
^
Det finns inga omdömen till denna titeln.
Klicka här
för att vara den första som skriver ett omdöme.
Are companies, churches, and states genuine agents? Or are they just collections of individual agents that give a misleading impression of unity? This question is important, since the answer dictates how we should go about explaining the behaviour of these entities and whether we should treat them as responsible and accountable in the manner of individuals. Group Agency offers a new approach to that question and is relevant, therefore, in a range of fields from philosophy to law, politics, and the social sciences. Christian List and Philip Pettit take the line that there really are group or corporate agents, over and above the individual agents who compose them, and that a proper social science and a proper approach to law, morality, and politics have to take account of this fact. Unlike some earlier defences of group agency, their account is entirely unmysterious in character and, despite not being technically difficult, is grounded in cutting-edge work in social choice theory, economics, and philosophy.
Preface p. vii Introduction p. 1 For realism about group agents p. 2 The historical novelty of our form of group-agent realism p. 7 Methodological implications, positive and normative p. 11 The Logical Possibility of Group Agents The Conditions of Agency p. 19 A basic account of agency p. 19 Complications in agency p. 25 The idea of group agency p. 31 The Aggregation of Intentional Attitudes p. 42 A paradox of majoritarian attitude aggregation p. 43 An impossibility result p. 47 Escape routes from the impossibility p. 51 The Structure of Group Agents p. 59 The organizational structure of a group agent p. 60 The supervenience of a group agent p. 64 The unmysterious autonomy of the group agent p. 73 The Organizational Design of Group Agents The Episteinic Desideratum p. 81 Formulating the epistemic desideratum p. 82 Satisfying the epistemic desideratum p. 86 Complications p. 97 The Incentive-Compatibility Desideratum p. 104 Formulating the incentive-compatibility desideratum p. 105 Satisfying the incentive-compatibility desideratum p. 109 Two routes to incentive compatibility p. 124 The Control Desideratum p. 129 Formulating the control desideratum p. 129 Satisfying the control desideratum p. 136 Broader lessons p. 144 The Normative Status of Group Agents Holding Group Agents Responsible p. 153 Fitness to be held responsible p. 153 The fitness of group agents to be held responsible p. 158 Individual and corporate responsibility p. 163 Personifying Group Agents p. 170 The conception of personhood p. 170 Group agents as persons p. 174 Group persons and respect p. 178 Identifying With Group Agents p. 186 Identification and self-identification p. 186 Corporate identification and self-identification p. 191 Multiple identities p. 195 References p. 202 Endnotes p. 214 General Index p. 231 Name Index p. 236